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BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Robert McElrath, 69, retired International 
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union 
Regional Director 
"The ..W~ue o-6 Commutt-Um WM a ~make .6CJteen. . . . They had 
to -6)..gWte out a way o-6 get:ting !Ud o-6 the I LWU. So they 
Jta.-Wed the .i6.6ue o-6 Commun.i6m. 0-6 c.oUMe, the 
anti-~tatehood people, mo.6t o-6 them WeJte anti~.6tatehood 
bec.aMe o-6 the Ouental popula.t.i..on, jumped onto the 
anti-Commun.i6t ..W~ue, too. It WMn 1t veJty populaJt to go 
aJtound and .6ay, 1 I 1m agaitv.~t ~tatehood bec.aMe thue Jap~ 
Me go-ing to take oveJt. 1 But U WM populaJt duJt.ing that 
plliod, that WM du!Ung the day~ o-6 SenatoJt Mc.CaJtthy, to 
woJtJty about Commun.-Wm. That 4 Hawai 1 .<. be.c.omu a ~tate, 
we 1 U have two ~toogu o-6 HaJtJty Blt.idgu and Jac.k Hall .in the 
U.S. Senate. But U WM a ~make .6CJteen. They wanted to get 
ud o-6 the I LWU • " 
Robert McElrath first came to Hawai'i in 1938 as a fireman aboard the 
Matson vessel Lihue. While working for Inter-Island Steamship 
Company, he became active in union activities. 
In 1947, he became the ILWU territorial representative in charge of 
all union organizing activities. He also served as the ILWU's 
territorial information director, editing the union's newspaper and 
appearing on radio broadcasts relating to the ILWU. 
During the 1950s McElrath and other ILWU leaders were suspected to be 
members of the Communist party. These allegations fueled those 
congressmen who maintained that Hawai 1 i's Communist influence would be 
a detriment to the union. 
McElrath in 1969 became ILWU Regional Director, succeeding Jack Hall. 
He retired in 1977. 
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CC: When you first arrived on the scene here, it was about 1938 or so, 
what were conditions like? The plantation conditions here? 
RM: We used to describe it as feudalism. Really, it wasn't. It was a 
paternalistic society. Conditions weren't as bad as a serf-lord 
relationship. But management was the boss and expected the employee 
to know it. And expected complete obedience. Even as to the 
employee's political activities. It was almost worth your job to 
become active in any political activity other than the Republican 
party. 
CC: We hear stories about some of that, and in terms of actually voting 
and delivering ballots, how did that get carried out from the plantation 
system? 
RM: The word generally came from Honolulu. From the Big Five agencies. 
And each manager was expected to deliver his box. In those days the 
voting booth was called a 11 box, .. not the 11 precinct11 as we know it 
today. It was the plantation box. And each manager was expected to 
deliver his box. And he worked very hard to do it because it was 
important to the plantations and the Big Five to control the 
1 eg i s 1 a tu re. 
CC: And that actually meant physically sometimes delivering the votes? 
They would actually be in charge of it? 
RM: Well, there was no open intimidation, but there was encouragement. 
And many of the people on the plantations had a great deal of respect 
for management. I remember the late Takaichi Miyamoto telling me 
that when he first joined the Democrat party on Maui, that his old 
Japanese father went to the plantation manager and apologized for 
his ingrate son becoming active in (chuckles) the Democratic party. 
The old man took off his hat, bowed properly, and said he was ashamed 
of that boy. 
CC: Why would a young man go against his father's wishes like that? 
What was going on at that time that caused •... 
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RM: Unlike plantation areas in other parts of the world, plantation 
employees' children went to school here. Something that you must 
give credit to the sugar industry for. Through the legislature, 
they saw to it that the children of the plantation workers went to 
school and they became educated. They could read and write. Their 
parents could not read and write. Many of them could not even read 
Japanese, let alone write, in those days. And I think even today, 
your Japanese papers here had special characters explaining what 
(chuckles) the other characters meant. It was an education. 
CC: Awareness from education. 
RM: Yes. And of course, people coming in from the Mainland. There were 
no travel restrictions. 
WN: What, in your opinion, when you first arrived and you saw what was 
going on in Hawai'i, what needed to be done? 
RM: My first view of labor conditions here was watching the ships being 
loaded and unloaded. I came on a merchant ship. And I noticed the 
pace that the stevedores worked at. They worked unlimited hours. 
It was ukupau. You worked until the job was done. In talking to 
them, you'd ask them, 11 Why the hell are you working so hard here? 11 
They'd say they got a job and they want to keep it, it's a good job. 
And stevedoring was considered the best job in those days in Hawai' i. 
Many of them, especially on the outside islands, worked for the 
plantation. And then, when the ship came in, they worked on the 
ship. It was called steamer hana, steamer day. They had two wage 
scales. When they worked in '"tlleplantation, they had the plantation 
seal e. When they worked on the ship, they had the steamer day seal e. 
And they liked that work. If they didn't work hard, somebody else 
would have their job. 
CC: We jump ahead a little bit, but in the midst of this labor organizing, 
one of the things right from the very beginning almost was the union's 
recognition of and support for the proposition that Hawai • i should 
be a state. Why was that? Why was that part of 1 abor' s position? 
RM: Well, as I told you the other day, to use the cliche, it was taxation 
without representation. People in the territory of Hawai'i were 
governed by all the 1 aws passed by the Congress but had no say in the 
enactment of such 1 aws. And under territorial status, if a Congress 
passed a law, it did not specifically apply to Hawai'i. It did not 
apply to Hawai' i. Hawai' i had to be incorporated into the act, 
otherwise it didn't apply. For example, they could pass a minimum 
wage and not include the territory of Hawai' i. We paid taxes, the 
same taxes that the people in the other forty-eight states paid, and 
we felt that we ought to have some say in enacting the 1 aws that we 
had to obey. 
One of the things that was particularly resented was that all of the 
judges in Hawai'i, except the police court judges, were appointed by 
the president of the United States and could be from anyplace. 
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Under the Organic Act, the governor had to be a resident of Hawai • i 
but not the judges. 
CC: So you could have a judge from Pennsylvania or from anywhere at a 11 • 
RM: We had several cases where people came over here and got out of the 
military; within a very short time, [became] appointed judges. 
CC: So, basically, it [statehood] was a fairness issue. 
RM: Yes. 
CC: Who were the people that were kind of allies and who were the people 
that were opposed to this statehood notion? What were the different 
forces there? 
RM: Generally speaking, from the early 1930s on, the Big Five leadership 
was pro-statehood. They were worried about sugar legislation. The 
old sugar act which gave some stability to the industry was not an 
act in perpetuity. It had to be enacted or re-enacted every now and 
then. I think the longest the act ever lasted was five years. 
Usually, it was two years. They had to be continually lobbying back 
there. It would be different if Hawai'i had a couple of senators 
and a couple of representatives to wheel and deal with their (chuckles) 
comrades in the House and Senate. 
There were some that were opposed to statehood. They thought that 
they were doing all right. Walter Dillingham was an excellent 
example of that. He felt that he could do all right without statehood. 
And he did all right. Walter had probably more influence in Washington, 
D.C. during Republican and Democrat administrations than any other 
individual in the 1 ast fifty years. 
CC: So, actually, these factions that were for it or against it weren't 
necessarily all Republicans or all Democrats. There were some 
Republicans on one side and some on the other? Is that how it ••• 
RM: Yes. Many Democrats were opposed to statehood; many Republicans. 
But there were two plebiscites. And the people of Hawai'i overwhelmingly 
supported statehood. Overwhelmingly. 
WN: So you had different camps opposed to statehood. You were talking 
about the Republican party being divided up into three types of 
factions? 
RM: Well, there were many factions in the Republican party as there were 
and are in the Democratic party, but there was not an anti-statehood 
faction as such. There was the Dillingham faction, but that was not 
an anti-statehood faction in the Republican party. Many people in 
the Dillingham faction of the Republican party were pro-statehood. 
CC: When the union, when the ILWU specifically, would endorse candidates, 
it would very often also endorse candidates from one party or the 
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other. What was really the criteria that would lead to labor•s 
backing of, or at least the ILwu•s choosing a candidate to support? 
RM: Oh, in a word, selfishness. If we could have an understanding with 
a candidate from either party as to certain things, and if we could 
trust him, we would support him. We supported many Republicans. We 
supported Joe Farrington for delegate to Congress. We supported 
Hiram Fong for U.S. Senate and for the Territorial House of 
Representatives. We supported 11 DOc 11 Hill from Hilo. Incidentally, 
11 DOC 11 was anti -statehood. 
CC: Okay, for instance, with 11 DOC 11 Hill, what were the qualities about 
11 DOC 11 Hill that would lead to deciding to support even though he 
took a position against, say, statehood, which you favored? 
RM: He was very much 1 ike Hi ram Fong. His word was good. It was hard 
to get, but if you could get it, he 1 d carry it out. I recall one 
time, he told me that the governor was going to sign a certain 
bill before the deadline. This bill would have been pocket vetoed 
by midnight one night and it hadn• t been signed. I called up 11 DOC 11 
about five o•clock in the afternoon. I says, 11 Is that bill going to 
be signed? .. 
He said, 11 When I give you my word, it•s good. That bill will become 
law ... And it was signed. 
CC: I think you were saying that in some ways having an enemy that you 
could count on or knew where they stood was better than a friend 
that was kind of •••• How did you say that? 
RM: I believe Jack Hall said it, was: we rather have an avowed enemy than 
a double-crossing friend. You don•t have to watch him. You know 
how he stands. It•s that double-crossing friend that you have to 
1 ook out for. 
WN: Was it the same criteria which enabled the union to support Farrington? 
Or why was Farrington supported? 
RM: The person that opposed Joe Farrington that year--! think we•re 
talking 1944, no 146--was Bill Borthwick, who was in the pocket of 
Governor [Ingram] Stainback. Governor Stainback wanted to get rid 
of Joe Farrington. Farrington was delegate to Congress. He was 
back in Washington, D.C. He was closer to the Democratic administration 
than Governor Stainback, an appointed Democrat. Stainback wanted a 
Democrat delegate to Congress. We felt that Joe Farrington was the 
better person. You could talk to Joe Farrington. He certainly 
wasn•t pro-union, but he wasn•t anti-union, either. He had a union 
contract at his newspaper, the Star-Bulletin. He had a contract with 
the typographical union. 
CC: Whereas Stainback was, at least became, one of the major attackers 
of unionism, only he led sort of the anti-Communist charge at one 
time. 
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RM: Well, he used that. I'm reminded of Dick English. He says, "The 
governor reminds me of a person who's been sleeping with a nest of 
hornets for years and suddenly discovered it." I think Dick English 
did that story in the old Saturday Evening Post. When the ILWU 
refused to support Bill Borthwick for delegate to Congress, Governor 
Stainback went all out to destroy the ILWU. One of the first things 
he did was to demand Jack Hall's resignation from the Police 
Commission. He had appointed Jack Hall to the Police Commission, 
and he expected Jack, apparently, to say "how high" when he would 
tell Jack to jump. Well, Jack wouldn't jump. So, he asked for 
Jack's resignation from the Police Commission . I believe I wrote 
the resignation. 
(Taping stops, then resumes.) 
CC: Actually, you know, we were jumping around a little bit, but to me, 
I was being somewhat consistent because I was thinking of Stainback 
and some of the diatribes he made about the issue of Communism and 
labor and things 1 ike that. I guess we should probably deal with 
that whole problem and how you saw that issue as being raised, and 
why, and some of that kind of thing. Why did labor really see that 
attack being raised ag·ai nst it? What was the extent of the Communist 
party in Hawai'i? Was it powerful? 
RM: I don't think so. It was blown all out of proportion to what it 
actually was. There was a classic statement about the guy that said 
he didn't know the difference between rheumatism and Communism; that 
these leaders of the union are doing fine by him and he's going to 
stick by them. The issue of Communism was a smoke screen. The ILWU 
was costing them a lot of money, and they knew it would cost a lot 
more. They had to figure out a way of getting rid of the ILWU. So 
they raised the issue of Communism. Of course, the anti-statehood 
people, most of them were anti-statehood because of the Oriental 
population, jumped onto the anti-Communist issue, too. It wasn't 
very popular to go around and say, "I'm against statehood because 
these Japs are going to take over." But it was popular during that 
period, that was during the days of Senator McCarthy, to worry about 
Communism. That if Hawai'i becomes a state, we'll have two stooges 
of Harry Bridges and Jack Hall in the U.S. Senate. But it was a 
smoke screen. They wanted to get rid of the I LWU. 
CC: The 1949 dock strike was one arena that saw sort of all the ammunition 
being brought to bear against the union. The anti-Communist tactics 
were part of that, I guess. Why were they raised so viciously then? 
What was that • • • 
RM: The employers had decided that they would take the ILWU on in its 
strongest fort, the waterfront. They felt that if they could beat 
the union on the waterfront, the workers in sugar and pineapple 
would run away from the union. They determined to just go for broke. 
I remember when they formed an organization of women. They called 
it the "Broom Brigade." They picketed the union every morning for 
two hours. Threw their wives on the picket line, their daughters, 
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their private secretaries. But they were detenni ned to get rid of 
the union. They weren 1 t worried about costs on the waterfront. 
They can always pass that on. The cost of shipping, you can always 
pass that on. They were worried about the costs and future costs of 
sugar and pineapple. They felt that if they could beat us at our 
strongest position, they wouldn 1 t have to worry about sugar and 
pineapple. It was a well thought out ~rogram. And if it hadn 1 t of 
been for the experienced leadership of the ILWU on the Mainland and 
the solidarity of the rank-and-file on the Mainland with the people 
down here, the Big Five would have won that strike. 
CC: It was also an issue of parity, too, wasn 1 t it? 
RM: That was the issue. The ILWU, before the strike began and all during 
the strike, offered to arbitrate the issue. They were thirty-two 
cents apart between San Francisco and Honolulu. The workers in San 
Francisco loaded the ship. The ship came down here. It was unloaded 
down here. The only thing that changed in that trip on that ship 
was the weather and the longshoremen 1 s wages. The longshoremen [in 
Hawai 1 i] got thirty-two cents an hour less. Same ship, same cargo, 
same crew, same union on both ends. The union knew that a longshore 
strike could create chaos in Hawai 1 i, so we offered to arbitrate. 
The employers sort of smeared arbitration as, oh, a Communist plot. 
They took up a collection among the business community. The collection 
was taken up by the publisher of the Honolulu Advertiser. They ran 
double-truck ads in the New York Times and a Washington, D.C. 
newspaper implying that arbitration was a Communist plot. It so 
infuriated Senator Wayne Morse that he says if that position is the 
position of the people of Hawai 1 i, perhaps they 1 re not ready for 
statehood. 
CC: There was no end to what they would stoop to. You were telling me 
that at one time in your career, you wrote an article quoting, 
what was it, a certain source that they claimed was a Communist 
source and it turned out it wasn 1 t. What was that story? 
RM: Oh, I (chuckles) stole verbatim an article from the Wall Street 
Journal and read it as my own on a radio program. One of the 
employer 1 S front organizations, IMUA, broadcast the next day that my 
program of the previous day was a typical Communist propaganda. I 
had taken it word for word right out of the Wall Street Journal. 
It was an employer 1 S analysis of desirable unemployment. You don 1 t 
want everybody out working. If you do, you lose your bargaining 
power on keeping wages at a given level. So, at that time, according 
to this Wall Street Journal story, the employers felt 4 percent was 
the desirable level of unemployment. I knew that these people would 
think that this story was Communist inspired. Later on, I revealed 
the whole thing on a radio program, and IMUA fired its research 
director. 
CC: For not catching your source? 
RM: Yes. 
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WN: That radio show, tell us something about it. How long did you have 
it. Why did you do it? How you got started. 
RM: The employers owned the newspapers. Both newspapers were part of 
the local system. They didn•t want to see a powerful labor union 
here. We were able to buy radio time, put our program across. At 
that time when we started radio, there were only two stations in 
Hawai • i, KGMB and KGU. One day we were told by KGMB that they• re 
not going to take and let us continue our radio program. Said 
they•re going to be neutral. nwe•re not going to sell any time to the 
employers, and we•re not going to sell any time to you ... Well, the 
employers had both newspapers. The Advertiser owned (chuckles) KGU, 
and the Star-Bulletin was heavily invested 1n KGMB (chuckles), so 
the employers decided to be .. neutral... But then, a person named 
Ralph Fitkin got a license, and he opened up radio station KHON. 
And Ralph Fitkin sold us time. 
CC: So, there was pretty good control of the sources of people•s 
information in the hands of a few people. 
RM: Oh, yes. The Japanese newspapers were better than the English 
papers. Both the Nippu Jiji and the Hawaii Hochi had English 
sections, but usually only two, three, four pages. But they were 
better than the English papers. 
CC: I think you told a story and it relates back to, I think, Betty 
Farrington. A quote about the whole statehood vote that demonstrates 
something about censorship of the press here. Could you tell us 
that? 
RM: The Star-Bulletin edited Drew Pearson•s column, Drew Pearson being 
the forerunner of Jack Anderson today. In fact, at that time, Jack 
Anderson was a leg man for Drew Pearson. The Bulletin edited out a 
paragraph that quoted Margaret Chase Smith, Senator Smith of Maine, 
as quoting Betty Farrington as saying, 11 Thank God the statehood bill 
didn•t pass. I wouldn•t have anything to run on next time ... No, 
this time. It was amazing to me because personal columns in newspapers 
cannot be changed. You can refuse to run the column, but you don•t 
edit the column. But the Star-Bulletin did edit Drew Pearson. 
CC: Didn•t you actually print both columns side by side? 
RM: Well, I didn•t, but I saw to it that it got to people that did do 
it. A group of Democrats ran an ad. 
CC: And what did they do in the ad? Compared the two or ..• 
RM: Compared the two. 
CC: Yeah. Well, that gets to an issue about the whole Farrington 
position. You would say that Mr. Farrington probably was a genuine 
advocate of statehood and . • • 
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RM: Oh, he was. Defintely, he was .••• He spent all of his time in 
Washington and a great deal of his personal fortune pursuing statehood. 
WN: How would you compare the tactics or the strategy between Joe 
Farrington and Jack Burns who later came on as delegate? 
RM: Well, Joe Farrington, being a Republican in an administration totally 
controlled by Democrats, didn't have much of a chance. The South, at 
that time, anti-people of color. Most of your people in the South, 
if they thought about Hawai'i being a state, shuddered at having a 
non-White in the Congress of the Senate. Jack Burns, a Democrat, he 
can work with the Democrat House, the Democrat Senate, and a Democrat 
president. Joe Farrington could work with the individual Republicans, 
but they were in a small minority. Small minority. Where the 
Republicans worked with some of the more conservative Southern 
senators, they couldn't convince the conservative Southern senators 
to support statehood for Hawai'i because of color. 
CC: Do you think the racism question was the biggest bar to Hawai'i's 
entry into the union? 
RM: I do, yes. There were several cases where photographs of people in 
Hawai'i were circulated surreptitiously among the Congressmen. There 
was one photograph of the Honolulu City Council circulated among 
Congressmen. I think at that time there was only one part-Hawaiian 
on the Council--the old, it was Board of Supervisors. I think that 
Sam Apoliona was there. Sam looked like he might be Haole. Actually, 
Sam was, I believe, hapa-Haole. But it was race. 
CC: And most of these other issues, whether it was a contiguous state 
and all those, you see as kind of the same sort of the smoke screen 
as the Red Scare. 
RM: Contiguity, I think, among many people, was a legitimate issue. But 
that was a Mainland issue, not a local issue. They weren't thinking 
of contiguity. That was the Mainland. The people that wanted 
contiguity were opposed to statehood for Alaska, also, although 
Alaska was only a few hundred miles away from the state of Washington. 
But they were opposed to it. 
WN: The race question. The majority of the rank and file of the ILWU 
consisted of Japanese. So, does that explain why 
·' 
RM: I wouldn't say a majority. I'd say a plurality. 
WN: Plurality, okay. Would that explain why the ILWU was singled out on 
the Mainland as being sort of a threat to Hawai'i. Or if Hawai'i 
became a state, the ILWU would be too powerful? 
RM: No, that was a job that was started by the employers. Then it got 
out of hand. The empl ayers fanned IMUA. But then, IMUA got out of 
hand. The employers formed it to help break the 1949 longshore 
strike. But every member of the lunatic fringe in town got into the 
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act. The employers in the end just stopped making any contributions 
to IMUA. But the people in the Mainland would never had heard of 
any so-called Communist problem in Hawai'i if it hadn't of been for 
the employers. Gosh, a place like New York City where you really 
had a large number of Communists, they elected a member to the City 
Council. They elected a person named Peter Caccione, an Italian, to 
the City Council. San Francisco, they ran people for mayor, ran 
people for governor. So this was a myth created by the employers. 
CC: A famous instance where you helped tape some FBI officers trying to 
make a deal with Jack Hall around the Smith Act, didn't they even 
assess what they thought of the Communist threat here? What was 
their . . . 
RM: Yes. They were interviewing Dave Thompson. He was the ILWU education 
director. I secretly bugged Dave's living room. In it, during the 
course of the interview and the conversation, this one agent said, 
"You can't put these people down here in any league at all with 
those in California." He says, "These people wouldn't make good 
Communists in the lowest cell in California. We're stuck with 
them." Those peoP,le, by the way, were subpoenaed by Jack Hall during 
the Smith Act trial because during the course of that conversation, 
they offered to see the man who pulled the strings and eliminate 
Jack as a defendant. 
(Taping stops, then resumes.) 
CC: That whole conversation with the FBI kind of illustrated, though, 
that the Smith Act trial and a lot of those anti-Communist charges 
weren't based on any real fear of Communists, right? 
RM: Well, certainly not in the minds of the FBI. He said, "These people 
wouldn't make good Communists in the lowest cell in California. 
We're stuck with them." 
CC: But yet, they brought criminal charges against people. 
RM: Yes, they wanted to change the leadership of the ILWU. They said so 
in that interview with Dave Thompson. As long as Jack Hall'd be a good 
boy and run the union the way they wanted it, they'd let him off the 
hook. Jack was the person they wanted to get in the Smith Act trial. 
The rest were window dressing. 
CC: The other group that was organizing that sort of parallels the 
solidification of the ILWU's base was the Democratic party. I think 
when we talked, you had some observations about what the return of 
those servicemen after World War II meant to that kind of organizing. 
What was the relationship between the Democratic party and the ILWU? 
Was it an overlap or did one permit the other? 
RM: No, the people that wanted to build a Democratic party--there really 
wasn't one. There was one in name only and a few individuals ran 
it. They would meet in Senator David Trask's office. Not young 
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David Trask today, but his father. The whole party could meet in 
somebody's office. But the people that wanted to build the party, 
people such as Jack Burns, it gave them a basis, especially the 
returning veterans. And I'm talking specifically, the Japanese 
veterans, the lOOth and 442. They gave the new Democrat leadership 
a basis to work from. The Republicans had a base. It was the 
business community. Run by the big business community. 
CC: When you say a base to work from, do you think the Republicans made 
a pretty big tactical error in not giving more prominence to the 
returning Nisei veterans? 
RM: Oh, yes. They tried to use the returning Japanese. They had them 
pick out a couple and had them run on the Republican ticket in the 
primary. But they didn't vote for them and they were never nominated. 
Would not give them any position of leadership. The Democrats did. 
That was a very bad mistake by the Repub 1 ican 1 eadership. One person--
well, there're a couple 6f people, eve~ more than that, in the 
Repub 1 ican party who wanted to bring the Japanese in as equals--was 
Mary Noonan. She worked very hard to bring in the Japanese and 
brought many of them into the Republican party. But they were never 
given positions of leadership. Never. 
CC: Whereas Jack Burns perceived a more, well, better use, I guess, of 
this sort of political force or •..• 
RM: Jack treated everybody as equals. Not because they were Japanese. 
He treated the Filipinos the same way as he would treat the Haoles. 
Jack was a religious man. He liked people. The Republican's refusal 
to absorb the Japanese into their 1 eadershi p gave Jack Burns an 
opportunity. But it wasn't just Jack Burns. There were many others. 
One person who was very active in building the Democratic party was 
in public relations for Castle & Cooke--Bill Norwood. Bill, later 
on, became governor of the Trust Territories during the Kennedy 
Administration. He was very active in building the Democrat party 
with Burns. As a matter of fact, he was Burns's administrative 
assistant during Burns's first term as governor. 
CC: You know there• s a 1 ot of talk about the two Jacks, Burns and Hall. 
What was their relationship? You put it a certain way when we talked 
before. Maybe you could tell us that. That's a good way of looking 
at it. 
RM: I don• t recall what I said, but Jack Hall and Jack Burns were close 
friends. But unlike what many people choose to believe, Jack Hall 
did not control Governor Burns. Burns had a mind of his own. Burns 
wanted a consensus government. And he built a consensus government. 
You look at Jack Burns's appointments. You always found a Big Five 
representative on the Board of Regents at the University of Hawai • i. · 
You found C.C. Cadagan of Alexander & Baldwin. You found Harold 
Eichelberger of American Factors. Whenever Governor Burns would 
appoint an ad hoc committee, you'd find the top business community 
leaders there. Somebody from the Dillingham operations. He had a 
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consensus government. 
And although he was a very staunch Catholic, went to mass every 
morning at 6:30, 7:00, he never let his personal religious views 
interfere with the operations of the state. I remember when the 
legislature overwhelmingly decriminalized abortions. He did not 
sign the bill. He let the bill become law without his signature. 
But he said at the time that although he personally abhorred abortions, 
he could not impose his wishes on the people, especially after the 
legislature had overwhelmingly passed the law. 
CC: How much credit do you think he deserves for the statehood measure 
finally passing Congress? 
RM: Probably more than anyone else at the time it happened. There were 
others who worked longer than Jack did, but Jack was able to work 
things out with President Johnson who at that time was Democrat 
leader of the Senate. He told Burns, 11 If you will back off this 
year and let Alaska come in first, I'll promise you that Hawai'i 
will come in next." And Jack Burns did that. He was severely 
criticized by the local newspapers for backing off. But Johnson 
delivered. First Alaska became the forty-ninth state, and we became 
the fiftieth. There was no way anyone else could have worked that 
out with Lyndon Johnson. 
CC: Might have hurt Burns, actually, when he had to come back and face 
Quinn in the first campaign for governor. How come he lost? 
RM: Bill Quinn was elected governor on a gimmick--the Second Mahele, 
where they were going to take all of these state 1 ands and sell • em 
to people for as little as $50 an acre. Bill Quinn couldn't deliver. 
He caused the Second Mahel e bill to be introduced into the Senate 
which was controlled by the Republicans at that time. The bill 
never even got out of his own Republican committee. The Second 
Mahele program of his elected him; and then when he didn't deliver, 
it defeated him. 
I was watching that [first] election [of 1959] very closely. Quinn's 
majority was dwindling. If that campafgn had gone another ten 
days, Burns would have beaten Quinn because people were catching on 
to this Second Mahele. If you read it, you could see that the land 
that was going to be put on the market, well, one area was Kekaha 
Sugar Company. (Chuckles) Would have put Kekaha Sugar Company out 
of business. Lot of people don • t know it, but much of the 1 and 
that many plantations have is leased from the state. No, Bill 
Quinn was a sincere person, but whoever talked him into that Mahele 
misused him. Certainly the Republicans weren't for it. They couldn't 
get it out of their own Republican Senate committee. 
CC: Do you think Burns had to play catch up because he'd been in Washington 
for those years, and when he came back, Quinn had sort of gotten 
some of the credit for statehood by being governor at the time? 
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RM: Well, that, Qui nn• s being governor helped him. It helped him. The 
Republican party was split when Sam King was governor. Sam King was 
Bill Quinn•s predecessor as governor of the territory. There was a 
1 ot of people that d idn• t 1 ike Sam getting that • cause Sam was not 
pro-Eisenhower. Sam was not pro-Eisenhower, he was pro-Taft. So, 
when Eisenhower got the nomination, the Eisenhower people felt that 
they ought to name the governor. As it was, a Taft supporter got 
the governorship and the Republican party was split. So, when Sam 
King was not reappointed, they put in Bill Quinn who was a Republican 
but was a middle of the roader. All the Republicans were happy. 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: Would you say that statehood was a bipartisan achievement or was 
that a victory for the Democratic party in Hawai • i? 
RM: It was bipartisan. There were Democrats that opposed it, especially 
some in the South. Not as many as there would have been had we had 
a Republican president. Because Lyndon Johnson knew how to get 
legislation through. 
WN: What about locally, though? 
RM: It was bipartisan. The people of Hawai•i in both plebiscites voted 
overwhelmingly for statehood. The constitution convention, which was 
held before we were a state, was bipartisan. It was under the 
contro 1 of the Repub 1 i cans, by the way. Sam King was the chairman 
of it, and Hebden Porte us, the secretary. Hebden at that time, I 
believe he was in the Territorial Senate. No, it was bipartisan. 
WN: Why was the ILWU opposed to the first constitution? 
RM: Basically, because of the 1 imited number of elected officials. lt•s 
the same today, by the way. It provided that only the governor and 
the lieutenant governor could be elected. I think we•re the tightest 
state in the union as far as the election of public officials. Many 
of them have sixty or seventy elected officials, if you count judges 
as public officials. It did not provide for initiative, referendum, 
or recall. At that particular time, the union was for initiative, 
referendum, and recall. Today, it is opposed to it, and I believe, 
for good reason. Today, it seems that initiative on certain issues 
incites a mob reaction. 
Well, perhaps the best example was the time we caused fluoridation 
to be put on the ballot over on the Big Island, and it was destroyed 
two to one. One of the finest things for children in the world is 
the fluoridation of the water supply. It• s done by the military, 
by the way, right here in Hawai 1 i. But people vote against it. 
They believe that fluoride will poison them in some way. People are 
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swayed by public relations firms in initiatives. 
WN: We were talking earlier about groups that were opposing statehood. 
And one group that we didn't talk about was the Native Hawaiian 
group. Like, for example, Kamokila Campbell. Can you tell me 
something about that viewpoint? 
RM: Kamokila was of the old school. She felt loyalty to Lili'uokalani, 
the old crown. Kamokila, incidentally, although she was opposed to 
statehood, was elected to public office. She was a senator elected 
from Maui. She was not of that group--well, in fact, it didn't 
exist--today, the group that ' s pretty well intellectually led by 
Haunani Trask. Kamok il a was a very weal thy woman. Well, not too 
wealthy. She had some land privately, but she was a beneficiary of 
the Campbell Estate. She wasn't advocating that Hawai'i be given 
its independence. She just felt a 1 oyal ty to the old monarchy. 
Felt that they were very shabbily treated, and they were. 
CC: So, there wasn't a real independence movement amongst the Hawaiian 
population back in those days? 
RM: No, no. 
CC: That's a recent ••.• 
RM: It's modern. I'd say, fifteen years. 
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